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Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of an asymmetric neg-
ative fertility shock on capital formation, saving/investment im-
balance, and welfare. The framework of analysis is a Diamond-
type overlapping-generations small open economy with capital
market imperfection. The capital market imperfection is mod-
elled through a symmetric wedge between foreign investor and
domestic investor return on capital. The shock is transmitted
to the small open economy depending on whether the wedge is
below a given threshold. If the wedge is not too high, capital
rst ows in the small open economy to exploit the di¤erence in
returns on capital. After the shock has occurred, capital is repa-
triated in order to nance the old age consumption of rest of the
world investors. If capital ows internationally, lifetime utility in
the small open economy decreases unambiguously for individuals
born one period before the shock occurs. Provided that the small
open economy is initially below its golden rule, individuals born
after the time the shock has occurred experience an increase in
their lifetime utility.
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1 Introduction
There exist large di¤erences in the timing and the size of the aging phe-
nomenon across regions of the world. Those di¤erences are transitory
(see United Nations [18]). In a two country framework, under standard
neoclassical assumptions, a partial equilibrium implication of the life
cycle hypothesis is that the bulk of the saving supply triggered by the
rapid aging country should ow to the slower aging country, where cap-
ital is relatively scarce and labor relatively abundant. This prediction
matches with the past decades surge in capital ows to younger/poorer
countries following their capital market liberalization. However, those
international capital ows appear to be limited compared to what the
neoclassical theory would predict, as claimed in Lucas [15]. Indeed,
several capital market imperfections are likely to impede demographic
di¤erences from fostering international capital ows. In addition, those
capital inows have been unevenly distributed across younger/poorer
countries. These stylized facts on capital movements, documented in
Prasad and al. [16], suggest a role for the interaction between aging
di¤erences and capital market imperfections in explaining both the tim-
ing, the magnitude and the distribution of international capital ows
across receiving countries. In the present framework, through introduc-
ing exogenous di¤erences in fertility rates, I generate di¤erences in capi-
tal returns between "source" (older) countries and "recipient" (younger)
countries that in turn explain the magnitude and the timing of the ows.
In the present paper, I provide an explanation for the uneven distrib-
ution of those ows across "recipient" countries through introducing a
wedge between domestic and foreign investors return to capture diversion
directed toward foreign investors.1 Diversion can be undertaken by pri-
vate agents (e.g. thievery, squatting or maa protection) or public agent
(e.g. conscatory taxation and corruption). Hall and Jones [12] provide
empirical evidence of the role of institutions and government policies
in explaining cross-country di¤erences in investment, productivity and
thus output per worker. Shleifer and Wolfenzon [17] model how agency
costs stemming from ine¢ cient corporate governance and law enforce-
ment mechanisms impede foreign capital from owing to capital-scarce
countries. Alfaro et al. [1] provide empirical evidence of the importance
of the quality of institutional arrangements in explaining the relative
lack of capital ows to developing countries. They argue that the e¤ect
of institutions on capital ows is the main channel through which the
former a¤ects output per capita.
1My argument takes further the main insight of the "push and pull" literature
initiated by Calvo et al. [7].
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The literature has been relatively silent on the relevance of the in-
teraction between di¤erences in the demographic dynamic and institu-
tions in explaining international capital movements but abundant on
the closed economy consequences of aging.2 A recent literature has been
addressing the economic consequences of aging di¤erences in an open
economy perspective using large scale simulation models.3 Among oth-
ers, Attanasio and Violante [3] and Brooks [5] simulations results point
to a signicant role of population age structure di¤erences in explaining
capital ow from fast aging OECD countries to slower aging emerging
markets. Brooks[5] simulation results also predict a future reversal in
the direction of those international capital ows. Indeed, Brooks[5] pre-
dictions suggest that capital will ow from currently younger countries
to currently older ones as the former will enter into the fast aging stage
of the demographic transition. There is however an important caveat to
the literature that is being addressed in the present paper. To the ex-
tent of my knowledge, there is no study that analyzes the open economy
adjustment to an asymmetric demographic shock in presence of capital
market imperfections.4 Arezki [2], building on Higgins [13], provides em-
pirical evidence of the relevance of the interaction between population
age structure di¤erences and institutional quality in explaining current
account position, using a panel of up to 115 countries over the period
1970 to 2000.
In this paper, I analyze the consequences of an asymmetric nega-
tive fertility shock on capital formation, saving/investment imbalance,
and welfare. The framework of analysis is a Diamond-type overlapping-
generations small open economy with a wedge between domestic and
foreign investors return to capture diversion. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes
the consequence of a rest of the world negative fertility shock on cap-
ital formation, saving/investment imbalances and welfare. In section
3.1, I nd that the rest of the world shock is transmitted to the small
open economy, depending on whether the wedge between the domestic
investor return and foreign investor return on capital is below a given
threshold. In section 3.2, I nd that if the wedge is not too high, capital
rst ows in the small open economy in order to exploit the di¤erences
in returns on capital. After the shock has occurred, capital is repatriated
2Bosworth and al.[4] provide a useful survey on the nancial and macroeconomic
consequences of aging.
3Geide-Stevenson [10] and Groezen and Leers [11] focus on the open economy
consequence of aging using Diamond type overlapping generations models in presence
of various pension arrangements .
4Kenc and al. [14] developed a simulation model to analyze the consequence of
aging in the European Union for Turkey, introducing imperfect capital mobility.
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in order to nance old-aged consumption of rest of the world investors.
In section 3.3, I nd that if capital ows internationally, lifetime util-
ity in the small open economy decreases unambiguously for individuals
born one period before the shock occurred. Provided that the small
open economy is initially below its golden rule of capital accumulation,
individuals born after the shock has occurred experience an increase in
their lifetime utility. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The model consists of a small open economy and the rest of the world
identical in every respect except in demographic patterns. Each country
is represented by competitive output and factor markets, two overlapping
generations (OLG), and an identical well-behaved constant returns to
scale production function f , a model due to Diamond [8]. Labor is not
mobile. Capital is perfectly mobile. The model is entirely standard
except that I assume a symmetric wedge between domestic investor and
foreign investor return on capital to capture diversion. The wedge is the
the result of iceberg costs on capital return repatriation, so that for each
unit of capital invested abroad a lump sum amount  of the return is
lost in transit.
All variables associated with the small open economy with respect to
the rest of the world are distinguished by the upper script SOE and by
the upper script RW respectively on the relevant variables. The variables
associated with the rest of the world are also distinguished by an upper
bar that indicates their exogenous nature.
2.1 Notation
ci1;t = consumption while young by an individual living at time t in
country i ; i 2 fSOE;RWg ;
ci2;t+1 = consumption while old by an individual at time t+ 1 living
in country i; i 2 fSOE;RWg ;
sit = aggregate asset owned while young by an individual at time
t living in country i; for i 2 fSOE;RWg ;
wit = real wage at time t in country i; for i 2 fSOE;RWg ;
rit = interest rate on country i individual assets carried from
period t  1 into period t in country i; for i 2 fSOE;RWg ;
kit = capital labor ratio in country i at time t; i 2 fSOE;RWg ;
nit = rate of growth of population in country i from period t  1
into t; for i 2 fSOE;RWg ;
 = pure rate of time preference;  > 0;
 = wedge between foreign investor and domestic investor return
on capital.
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2.2 Individuals
Individuals in both regions live two periods: they work in the rst period
of their lives, and retire in the second. During the rst period of their life
each individual supplies inelastically one unit of labor. The optimization
problem for an individual living in country i is given by equations (1),
(2) and (3). The utility of lifetime consumption is maximized subject
to an intertemporal budget constraint given by (2). The properties on
U i ensure that the intertemporal budget constraint will hold with equal-
ity and that an interior solution will be obtained for ci1;t; c
i
2;t+1 for i 2
fSOE;RWg :
max
ci1;t;c
i
2;t+1
U i(ci1;t; c
i
2;t+1) = u(c
i
1;t) +
1
1 + 
u(ci2;t+1) (1)
ci1;t +
ci2;t+1
1 + rt+1
 wit (2)
ci1;t; c
i
2;t+1  0 (3)
For simplicity, I assume that the utility function is time separable
and that the subutility function, u, is logarithmic. Thus the optimal
saving of a young individual born at time t in country i is given by the
following expression:
si1;t =
wit
2 + 
(4)
Optimal portfolio return namely r is the result of investors behavior
analyzed in the following.
2.3 Firms
Firms located in region imaximize prots taking as given domestic factor
prices. Equations (5) and (6) state that the capital rental market and
labor market in region i are competitive.5 I assume that capital fully
depreciates over a period of time. Thus gross investment equals net
investment.
rit = f
0(kit)  1 (5)
wit = f(k
i
t)  kitf 0(kit) (6)
5For i 2 fSOE;RWg.
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2.4 Investors
Given the presence of iceberg costs, the e¤ective return associated with
foreign investment equals domestic investor return minus a wedge,  .
Investors optimize the return on their portfolio taking as given returns
in both locations. Optimization decision for a given investor i at period
t is formally given by the following expression:6
rt = max(r
i
t; r
j
t   ) (7)
2.5 Asset Allocation Equilibria
As a result of investors portfolio return optimization, the world economy
can be at three di¤erent asset allocation equilibria:
1. At equilibrium of type 1, individuals located in both regions invest
all their assets domestically. At this equilibrium, the rate of return
on aggregate assets for an individual living in a given region equals
her domestic return.
2. At equilibrium of type 2, small open economy individuals invest all
their assets domestically and rest of the world individuals invest
their assets in both locations. At this equilibrium, individuals
living in the small open economy receive rSOE as a return on their
aggregate assets. Individuals living in the rest of the world receive
rSOE   as a return on their aggregate assets.
3. At equilibrium of type 3, small open economy individuals invest
their assets in both locations and rest of the world individuals
invest all their assets domestically. At this equilibrium, the small
open economy individuals receive rRW   as a return on their
aggregate assets. Individuals living in the rest of the world receive
rRW as a return on their aggregate assets.
For the purpose of realism, I am only interested in equilibria where
in both regions individuals invest in the small open economy that corre-
sponds to type 1 and 2 equilibria. At these two equilibria, an individual
of a given region i born at time t receives her domestic return ri as a
return on her aggregate asset.7
6For i and j 2 fSOE;RWg with i 6= j.
7For i 2 fSOE;RWg.
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2.6 Equilibrium
Let us now collect the equations characterizing the equilibrium in both
regions. In the following subsection, I also present the way I model the
occurrence of an asymmetric negative fertility shock, whose consequences
are analyzed in the following section.
2.6.1 Rest of the World
Whether the world economy is at type 1 or type 2 equilibrium does not
a¤ect the rest of the world economy. Indeed, given the small open econ-
omy assumption, the rest of the world economy is una¤ected by changes
a¤ecting the small open economy. The dynamic equilibrium of the rest
of the world economy, described in details in appendix A.1, corresponds
to the equilibrium of a standard closed economy OLG model.
Further assuming that the production function f is twice di¤eren-
tiable and follows the Inada conditions, I obtain a rst order di¤erence
equation in kRWt that describes the evolution of the model from arbitrary
initial conditions given by the following expression:8
kRWt+1

(1 + nRWt+1 )
  f(kRWt )  kRWt f 0(kRWt )
2 + 

= 0 (8)
I assume that the rest of the world is subject to a fertility shock. RW
denotes the size of the shock and hRW denotes the time pattern of the
shock.9 The fertility rate of the rest of the world economy at time t, nRWt
is assumed to be equal to the sum of its steady state value nRWss (being
further normalized to zero) and its deviation from the steady state given
by RWhRWt as described in expression (9). The variables evaluated at
the economy steady state are distinguished by a lower index ss:
nRWt = n
RW
ss + 
RWhRWt (9)
I characterize the steady state of the rest of the world economy
through formally giving the expression of its domestic returns at the
steady state:
rRWss = f
0(k
RW
ss )  1 (10)
with k
RW
ss corresponding to the x point solution of the di¤erence
equation (8).
8The Inada formally rewrites f(0) = 0; f 0  0; f 0(0) = +1 and f 0(0) = 0.
9In the case of a one period shock, hRWt takes the
form:f0 at t = 0 , :::, 0 at t = t0   1,   1 at t = t0, 0 at t = t0 + 1,...g
with t0 denoting the time at which the shock occurs.
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2.6.2 Small Open Economy
As stated before, I am only interested in equilibria where individuals
living in both regions invest in the small open economy. I therefore
describe the dynamic equilibrium of the small open economy for type 1
and type 2 equilibria where the small open economy individuals receive
rSOE as a return on their aggregate assets invested. I assume that the
small open economy is not subject to any fertility shock. Thus its fertility
rate at any period t, nSOEt , is at its steady state value (being further
normalized to zero).
At the equilibrium of type 1, the small open economy is as if it were
in autarky. The dynamic equilibrium of the small open economy from
initial conditions guaranteeing equilibrium of type 1, corresponds to the
equilibrium of a standard closed economy OLG model.
At the equilibrium of type 2, rest of the world individuals invest in the
small open economy. The small open economy dynamic equilibrium is
a¤ected by changes in the rest of the world economy. At this equilibrium
the no arbitrage condition between rest of world investors return on
domestic investment and their e¤ective return on investment in the small
open economy is now binding. Thus the domestic return in the small
open economy is pinned down by the rest of the world domestic return.
The dynamic equilibrium of capital labor ratio at equilibrium of type
2 in the small open economy is formally determined by the following
expression:
kSOEt = f
0 1
(rRWt + 1 + ) (11)
At the steady state, the small open economy is identical to rest of
the world economy in per capita terms.
3 Consequences of a Rest of the World Fertility
Shock
In this section, I analyze the consequences of a rest of the world negative
fertility shock on capital formation, saving/investment imbalances and
welfare for both regions. I assume that the initial conditions in both
regions are such that the world is at type 1 equilibrium. Depending on
whether the wedge is below a given threshold, the occurrence of a shock
is likely to drive the world economy to an equilibrium of type 2.
3.1 Capital Formation
The consequences of an asymmetric fertility shock on capital formation
are analyzed rst in the rest of the world economy. Then I explore the
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transmission of the consequences of such an asymmetric shock to the
small open economy.
3.1.1 Rest of the World
I assume that the rest of the world is subject to a transitory negative
fertility shock.10 11 To study the consequences of such a shock on the
rest of the world economy, I di¤erentiate (8) with respect to nRWt around
the economy steady state. I obtain the following expression:
dk
RW
t+1
dRW
(1 + nRWss ) =
 kRWss f 00(kRWss )
2 + 

dk
RW
t
dRW
  kRWss hRWt+1 (12)
To ensure local stability of the system described by equation (12), I
assume that dk
RW
t+1
dk
RW
t
< 1 that is equivalent to
h
 kRWss f
00
(kRWss )
(2+)(1+nRWss )
i
< 1.
At time t0, a decline in the fertility rate mechanically increases the
capital labor ratio through a reduction in the capital required to endow
new workers. Formally, the short term impact of a negative fertility
shock occurring at time t0 on fertility is given by
 kht0
(1+nRWss )
> 0. After pe-
riod t0, a higher capital labor ratio leads to a higher real wage and saving
rate. Indeed, the competitive labor market condition (6) implies that
a lower employment level translates into a wage increase, thus increas-
ing individual lifetime resources. Given that consumption at both ages
are not inferior goods, consumptions in both periods are an increasing
function of labor income. Consumption of the working age individuals
increases but by less than their real wages, so that their saving increases,
thus increasing the capital labor ratio (and so on and so forth).
Given the transitory nature of the shock and the stability condition
imposed on the system, the e¤ect of the shock vanishes over time. A
transitory fertility shock has therefore no persistent impact on the rest
of the world capital labor ratio. Only a permanent fertility shock has a
long run impact on the rest of the world capital labor ratio. Formally,
the long run e¤ect of a permanent fertility shock, dk
RW
dRW
; is given by the
xed point solution to equation (12):12
dkRW
dRW
=
 kRWss hRW
(1 + nRWss ) +
kRWss f
00 (kRWss )
2+
> 0 (13)
10I only consider a one period shock for expositional purpose. My main results are
qualitatively similar in the case of a multi-period shock.
11Given the specic form of the utility function, whether the shock is anticipated
or not does not a¤ect individuals behavior.
12The time pattern of a permanent negative shock occurring at time t0, hRW , takes
the form: f0 at t = 0, :::, 0 at t = t0   1,   1 at t = t0,   1 at t = t0 + 1, :::g :
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The stability condition su¢ ces to ensure that the long run e¤ect of
a permanent fertility shock is positive.
The impact of an asymmetric transitory shock on the rest of the
world interest rate is given by the following expression:
drRWt
dRW
= f
00
(kRWss )
dk
RW
t
dRW
 0 (14)
I now establish a proposition on the consequences of an asymmetric
demographic shock on capital formation in the small open economy.
3.1.2 Small Open Economy
Proposition 1 A rest of the world negative fertility shock translates into
an increase in the small open economy capital labor ratio if the wedge
between domestic and foreign investor return on capital is lower than the
exogenous short run impact of a negative fertility shock on the rest of the
world interest rate.
Proof. When one starts from steady state in both regions, if  is higher
than the short run di¤erence between the two regions before any poten-
tial transmission that formally implies  
 drRWt0dRW , the world economy
is at the equilibrium of type 1 at time t0. Given the stability condition
imposed on (12), the world economy remains at the equilibrium of type
1 for all t > t0. Thus there is no e¤ect on capital formation in the small
open economy that formally implies dk
SOE
t
dRW
= 0 for all t if  
 drRWt0dRW .
When one starts from steady state in both regions, if  is smaller than
the short run di¤erence between the two regions before any potential
transmission that formally implies  <
 drRWt0dRW , the world economy jumps
at the equilibrium of type 2 at time t0. For all t > t0 for which  < drRWtdRW , the world economy is at equilibrium of type 2: Given the stability
condition on (12), for all t  t, with t such that  
 drRWtdRW  the world
economy is at equilibrium of type 1. Thus there is a positive impact
of the rest of the world asymmetric shock on capital formation in the
small open economy that formally implies dk
SOE
t
dRW
> 0 for all t such that
t0  t > t.
The impact of a rest of the world negative fertility shock on the
small open economy capital formation is formally given by the following
expression:13 14
13Substituting
dk
RW
t0
dRW
in (14), I obtain
 drRWt0dRW  = f 00 (kRWss )kRWss(1+nRWss ) .
14t0 is such that  <
 drRWt0dRW  and t is such that    drRWtdRW .
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dkSOEt
dRW
=

1
f 00(kRWss )

drRWt
dRW
+ 

> 0 for t > t  t0 (15)
=0 otherwise (16)
Appendix A.2 formally describes the detail of the derivation that
leads to the above expression.
The transmission mechanism is interpreted as follows. If the wedge
level is below a certain threshold, a rest of the world negative fertility
shock leads to a decrease in the return on capital in that region. Capital
ows to the small open economy in order to exploit the di¤erence in
returns. The world economy reaches the equilibrium of type 2. Thus
the small open economy capital labor ratio increases. As the shock
vanishes in the rest of the world, small open economy capital inows
vanish over time too. Capital ows stop when the di¤erence between
domestic returns in both regions is lower than the wedge, so that there
is no incentive to invest abroad. The world economy returns to the
equilibrium of type 1. Thus there is no long term e¤ect of a rest of
the world transitory fertility shock on the small open economy capital
formation.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Small Open Economy Capital Formation over
Time
From (15), it is straightforward to show that given the assumption on
diminishing returns, a marginally higher wedge limits the transmission of
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a rest of the world shock in terms of higher capital labor ratio. Indeed
the equilibrium is reached through capital owing to the small open
economy, up to the point where there is no arbitrage between returns
in the di¤erent locations. Thus a marginally higher wedge reduces the
level of capital ows to the small open economy necessary to fulll the no
arbitrage condition between returns. Figure 1 displays the evolution over
time of the small open economy capital formation for di¤erent degrees
of diversion.15
In the following subsection, I establish two propositions on the con-
sequences of a rest of the world negative fertility shock on international
capital movements.
3.2 Saving/Investment Imbalance
In the following, I analyze the consequences of an asymmetric shock both
on the small open economy balance-of-trade surplus (decit), BSOE and
on the current account surplus (decit), GSOE.
The small open economy balance-of-trade surplus at time t is the
excess of net domestic product at time t, Y SOEt ; over domestic absorp-
tion. Domestic absorption is the sum of aggregate consumption at time
t, CSOEt , and domestic capital formation used in the production at time
t+ 1, KSOEt+1 :
BSOEt = Y
SOE
t   CSOEt  KSOEt+1 (17)
with
Y SOEt = F (K
SOE
t )   t(KSOEt   SSOEt 1 ) (18)
with  t given by (37). In per capita terms the net production can be
rewritten:
ySOEt = f(k
SOE
t )   t(kSOEt  
sSOEt 1
1 + nSOEt
) (19)
Indeed, in presence of iceberg costs the relevant measure of domestic
production is domestic production net of transit losses.
Formally, the per capita balance-of-trade surplus of the small open
economy is given by the following expression:
bSOEt = y
SOE
t   cSOE1;t  
cSOE2;t
(1 + nSOEt )
  kSOEt+1 (1 + nSOEt+1 ) (20)
15The gures are based on the following Cobb-Douglas technology, f(k) = k0:33.
Further more  = 0:5 and the low, medium and high wedge levels correspond re-
spectively to the following values of  :  low = 120

drRWt0
dRW

, medium = 15

drRWt0
dRW

,
high =
drRWt0
dRW
.
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Under the assumption that the technology is constant returns to
scale, after some rearrangements, I obtain:
bSOEt = (1 + r
SOE
t    t)

kSOEt  
sSOEt 1
(1 + nSOEt )

+ sSOEt   kSOEt+1 (1 + nSOEt+1 )
(21)
The current account surplus is the excess of net national product
over domestic absorption. Net national product equals net domestic
product at time t, Y SOEt , plus net foreign investment income at time t
that is formally given by rSOEt (S
SOE
t  KSOEt ).16 The small open economy
current account surplus at time t is given by:
GSOEt = Y
SOE
t + r
SOE
t (S
SOE
t  KSOEt )  CSOEt  KSOEt+1 (22)
In per capita terms, the current account surplus reduces to the fol-
lowing expression:
gSOEt = (1   t)

kSOEt  
sSOEt 1
(1 + nSOEt )

+ sSOEt   kSOEt+1 (1 + nSOEt+1 ) (23)
At the steady state, the small open economy balance-of-trade and
the current account equal zero, as the two regions become identical in
every respect (in per capita terms). However, if the wedge is strictly
below a certain threshold given by
drSOEt0dRW , the occurrence of a rest of
the world fertility shock is likely to impact upon the small open econ-
omy balance-of-trade and current account. To analyze the e¤ect of an
asymmetric demographic shock on saving/investment imbalance, I dif-
ferentiate expressions (21) and (23) with respect to nRWt . Appendix A.3
presents the details of the linearization of those expressions.
I can now establish the following proposition on the consequences of a
rest of the world negative fertility shock on saving/investment imbalance
in the small open economy.
Proposition 2 At the end of time t0   1, capital ows into the small
open economy, provided that the wedge between domestic and foreign
investor return is lower than the exogenous short run impact of a negative
16Net foreign investment income equals interest rate payments on the di¤erence
between the small open economy aggregate assets at time t minus domestic capital
stock installed in the small open economy at time t. The economy being either
at equilibrium of type 1 or 2, the interest rate received on small open economy
individuals assets, rSOE , equals the interest rate served on foreign investment in the
small open economy (before transit losses occur).
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fertility shock on the rest of the world interest rate. If the latter condition
holds, at the end of time t0 capital is repatriated in order to nance the
old-aged consumption of rest of the world investors.
Proof. see appendix A.4.
At the end of time t0   1; capital ows to the small open economy
in order to exploit di¤erences in returns, provided that the wedge is
below a given threshold. The deviation from steady state of the current
account position of the small open economy at time t0   1 is given by
the following expression:
dgSOEt0 1
d
=  dk
SOE
t0
dRW
 0 (24)
At time t0, capital ows out of the small open economy. Indeed,
capital is repatriated to the rest of the world in order to nance old-
aged investorsconsumption. Formally, this is described by the following
expression:
dgSOEt0
d
=

1 +
 kSOEss f 00(kSOEss )
2 + 

dkSOEt0
dRW
  dk
SOE
t0+1
dRW
> 0 (25)
I establish another proposition as regards the capital movements re-
sulting from a rest of the world asymmetric shock.
Proposition 3 Provided that the wedge is below a certain threshold, a
marginally higher wedge limits the magnitude of the small open econ-
omy capital inows and outows resulting from of a rest of the world
asymmetric fertility shock.
Proof. For t = t0 1, I combine (15) together with (24), and I then dif-
ferentiate this combination with respect to  : Using the fact that the rest
of the world interest is exogenous, I obtain
d
 
dgSOEt0 1
d
!
d
=  
h
1
f
00
(rRWss +1)
i
>
0: A marginally higher wedge improves the small open economy current
account position at time t0   1.
For t = t0; I combine (25) and (15), and then I di¤erentiate this
combination. It is then straightforward to show that
d
 
dgSOEt0
d
!
d
< 0. A
marginally higher wedge deteriorates the current account position at
time t0.
At the equilibrium, a marginally higher wedge requires that for a
given rest of the world interest rate, the return in the small open economy
will be higher. The diminishing returns assumption implies that the
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small open economy capital labor ratio should be lower for a given rest
of the world interest rate. Thus less capital should ow to the small open
economy to adjust for a rest of the world negative fertility shock. Figure
2 displays the evolution over time of the small open economy current
account position for di¤erent degrees of diversion.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Small Open Economy Current Account Position
over Time
In the following subsection, I establish two propositions on the con-
sequences of such an asymmetric shock on lifetime utility of individuals
living in both regions.
3.3 Welfare Analysis
In order to evaluate the impact of a fertility shock on lifetime utility, I
di¤erentiate the lifetime utility function of individuals born at time t and
living in region i with respect to nRWt .
17 The details of the linearization
are shown in appendix A.5.
In the following subsection, I establish a proposition on the impact
of a rest of the world negative fertility shock on the lifetime utility of
rest of the world individuals.
3.3.1 Rest of the World
Proposition 4 Rest of the world individuals lifetime utility decreases
unambiguously for individuals born one period before the shock occurs.
17For i 2 fSOE;RWg.
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Under the assumption that the economy is initially below the golden rule,
individuals born after the shock has occurred experience an increase in
their lifetime utility.
Proof. see the following.
Generations born before period t0   1 do not experience any change
in their lifetime utility. The generation born at time t0   1 experiences
an unambiguous decrease in its lifetime utility. Indeed, a negative fer-
tility shock decreases this generation old-aged utility ow through lower
interest rate payments. Formally, the deviation from steady state of the
lifetime utility of rest of the world individuals born at time t0 1 is given
by the following expression:
dURWt0 1
dRW
=
1
cRW2ss
1
1 + 
dcRW2;t0
d
< 0 (26)
with
dcRW2;t0
d
=

wRWss
2 + p

drRWt0
dRW
< 0 (27)
Using (14), it is straightforward to show that the impact on lifetime
utility of generation born at time t0 1 in the rest of the world is negative.
Generations born after t0  1 experience an increase in their lifetime
utility provided that the economy is below the golden rule. For individu-
als born after the shock has occurred, a negative fertility shock increases
unambiguously their young-aged utility ow through an increase in their
real wage. However, the e¤ect of such a shock on old-aged utility ows
is ambiguous. Indeed, there are two opposite e¤ects resulting from a
fertility rate shock on old-aged utility ows. First, a negative fertility
shock tends to increase the amount of saving available at retirement age
through a real wage increase. Second, a negative fertility shock tends
to decrease old-aged wealth through a decrease in interest payments for
a given real wage. The overall e¤ect of a negative fertility shock on
lifetime utility is positive if the rest of the world economy is initially
below the golden rule of capital accumulation. Formally, the condition
can be rewritten nRWss < r
RW
ss . The details of the proof is provided in
appendix A.6. Indeed, if the rest of the world economy is initially below
the golden rule, the economy is dynamically e¢ cient. A negative fertility
shock raising capital labor ratio further increases the economy e¢ ciency.
I can now establish a proposition on the consequence of such an
asymmetric shock on lifetime utility of an individual living in the small
open economy.
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3.3.2 Small Open Economy
Proposition 5 If capital ows internationally, lifetime utility decreases
unambiguously for small open economy individuals born one period before
the shock occurs. Provided that the small open economy is initially below
its golden rule, small open economy individuals born after the time the
shock has occurred experience an increase in their lifetime welfare.
Proof. I need to distinguish between two cases depending on whether
or not capital ows internationally following a rest of the world nega-
tive fertility shock. If  
 drRWt0dRWt0 , capital does not ow internationally
following an asymmetric fertility shock. The world economy remains
at capital equilibrium of type 1. Small open economy lifetime utility is
not a¤ected for all generations. If  <
 drRWt0dRWt0 , capital does ow inter-
nationally and the welfare of some generations living in the small open
economy is a¤ected. For small open economy individuals born before pe-
riod t0   1; there is no impact of an asymmetric shock on their lifetime
utility. For individuals born at period t0   1; lifetime utility decreases
unambiguously for this generation. Provided that the economy is ini-
tially below the golden rule, a rest of the world negative fertility shock
increases lifetime utility in the small open economy for the generation
born after t0  1. Formally, for individuals born after period t0  1; life-
time utility increases if nSOEss < r
SOE
ss :The details of the proof is provided
in appendix A.6.
These results are interpreted as follows. A small open economy ag-
ing slower than the rest of the world will experience change in welfare
for some of its individuals provided that capital ows internationally.
If the latter condition holds, the small open economy generation born
one period before the shock occurs will unambiguously face a decrease
in its lifetime utility. Generations born after the shock has occurred will
experience an increase in welfare, provided that the small open economy
is initially below the golden rule of capital accumulation. Figure 3 dis-
plays the evolution of small open economy individuals lifetime utility
over their birth periods for two di¤erent degrees of diversion.
17
t0t0-1 t0+1
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Generation period of birth
Li
fe
tim
e 
U
til
ity
  (
in
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e)
high wedge
low wedge
Figure 3: Evolution of Small Open Economy Individuals Lifetime Utility
4 Conclusion
Our objective in this paper has been to analyze the consequences of
an asymmetric fertility shock on capital formation, saving/investment
imbalance, and welfare. The framework of analysis is a Diamond-type
overlapping-generations small open economy with diversion. Diversion
is modelled through a symmetric wedge between foreign investor and
domestic investor return on capital. A number of results are obtained.
A rest of the world negative fertility shock is transmitted to the small
open economy, depending on whether the wedge is below a given thresh-
old. If the wedge is not too high, capital rst ows into the small open
economy to exploit the di¤erence in returns on capital. After the shock
has occurred, capital is repatriated in order to nance the old-aged con-
sumption of rest of the world investors. If capital ows internationally,
lifetime utility in the small open economy decreases unambiguously for
individuals born one period before the shock occurs. Provided that the
small open economy is below its golden rule, individuals born after the
time the shock has occurred experience an increase in their lifetime util-
ity.
Those results have important implication for policies. Indeed, it sug-
gests that countries with young population and low capital intensity
should implement policies to strengthen institutions in order to allow
foreign investors in older countries to take advantage of di¤erential in
returns. The transitory nature of those demographic di¤erences call for
18
rapid reforms in order for relatively younger countries with low capital
intensity not to miss such opportunity. In addition, the consequences of
those induced capital ows on welfare suggests that not all generations in
those younger countries will benet. From a political economy perspec-
tive, this suggest that government in those younger countries should per-
haps compensate the losers in order to build consensus around reforms
aiming at attracting foreign investment to exploit temporary di¤erences
in returns due do di¤erences in demographic dynamics.
The model can be extended in a number of directions. Within the
context of our small open economy Diamond type model with diver-
sion, this framework will analyze the adjustment of an asymmetric shock
through labor mobility in the presence of transaction costs.18 A wel-
fare comparison on the adjustment to an asymmetric demographic shock
through capital movement and labor movement can also be conducted.
18Galor [9] analyzes the welfare implications of international labor movement in a
two-country overlapping generations framework, in presence of time preference rate
di¤erences.
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A Appendix
A.1 Rest of the World Dynamic Equilibrium
Individuals optimization problem
max
cRW1;t ;c
RW
2;t+1
U(cRW1;t ; c
RW
2;t+1) = u(c
RW
1;t ) +
1
1 + 
u(cRW2;t+1) (28)
cRW1;t +
cRW2;t+1
1 + rRWt+1
 wRWt (29)
cRW1;t ; c
RW
2;t+1  0 (30)
Firms optimization problem
rRWt = f
0(kRWt )  1 (31)
wRWt = f(k
RW
t )  kRWt f 0(kRWt ) (32)
Capital market equilibrium condition
sRW1;t = k
RW
t+1 (1 + n
RW
t+1 ) (33)
kRWt  0 (34)
The rst order di¤erence equation in kRWt that describes the evolu-
tion of the model from arbitrary initial conditions is given by the follow-
ing expression:
kRWt+1

(1 + nRWt+1 )
  f(kRWt )  kRWt f 0(kRWt )
2 + 

= 0 (35)
A.2 Capital Formation
For t such that t < t0, that is before the shock occurs, a rest of the
world negative fertility shock has no impact on the small open economy
capital formation.
For t such that t  t0, I formally derive the consequences of a rest
of the world negative fertility shock on the small open economy inter-
est rate through di¤erentiating the following expression with respect to
nRWt around the world economy steady state.
rSOEt    t = rRWt (36)
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with  t such that
 t=  for all t such that  <
drRWtdRW
 (37)
=0 otherwise (38)
Note rst that for all t for which
 drRWtdRW  >  , the rest of the world
investor no arbitrage condition, that is formally given by rRWt = r
SOE
t   ,
is binding and the world economy is at equilibrium of type 2.
After di¤erentiating (37), the following expression then holds:
d t
dRW
=  for all t such that  <
drRWtdRW

=0 otherwise (39)
After di¤erentiating expression (36), I formally have that:19
drSOEt
dRW
=
drRWt
dRW
+  for all t such that  <
drRWtdRW
 (40)
=0 otherwise (41)
To determine the e¤ect of a fertility shock on the small open economy
capital formation, I di¤erentiate the following expression with respect to
nRWt around the small open economy steady state.
kSOEt = f
0 1(rRWt +  t + 1) (42)
That reduces to the following expression:
dkSOEt
dRW
=

1
f 00(kRWss )

drRWt
dRW
+ 

> 0 8t such that  <
drRWtdRW

=0 otherwise (43)
19Note that if the condition
 drRWtdRW  >  holds, it is as if the wedge variable,  t, is
subject to a shock of intensity  , simultaneous to the fertility shock and that lasts
until the above condition holds.
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A.3 Current Account Expression Linearization
To determine the e¤ect of a rest of the world shock on the small open
economy balance-of-trade, I di¤erentiate the balance-of-trade expression
namely equation (21) with respect to nRWt around the small open econ-
omy steady state. Formally, I obtain the following expression:20
dbSOEt
dRW
= (1 + rSOEss )

dkSOEt
dRW
  ds
SOE
t 1
dRW

+
dsSOEt
dRW
  dk
SOE
t+1
dRW
(44)
After some substitutions, I obtain the deviation from steady state
equilibrium of the small open economy balance-of-trade.
dbSOEt
d
=

(1 + rSOEss )
kSOEss f
00
(kSOEss )
2 + 

dkSOEt 1
dRW
+ (45)
(1 + rSOEss ) +
 kSOEss f 00(kSOEss )
2 + 

dkSOEt
dRW
  dk
SOE
t+1
dRW
(46)
In order to determine the e¤ect of such an asymmetric shock on the
small open economy current account, I di¤erentiate (23) with respect
to nRWt around the small economy steady state. Formally, I obtain the
following expression:
dgSOEt
d
=
dsSOE1;t
d
 
d(
sSOE1;t 1
(1+nSOEt )
)
d
+
dkSOEt
d
  d(k
SOE
t+1 (1 + n
SOE
t+1 ))
d
(47)
After some substitutions, I obtain the small open economy current
account deviation from steady state:
dgSOEt
dRW
=

dkSOEt
dRW
  ds
SOE
t 1
dRW

+
dsSOEt
dRW
  dk
SOE
t+1
dRW
(48)
After some manipulations, I nally get:
dgSOEt
d
=

kSOEss f
00
(kSOEss )
2 + 

dkSOEt 1
dRW
+

1 +
 kSOEss f 00(kSOEss )
2 + 

dkSOEt
dRW
 dk
SOE
t+1
dRW
(49)
20Note that at the steady state equilibrium, the world economy is at capital own-
ership of type 1. Thus  >
 drRWtdRW , so that  t =  ss = 0, for all t such that the small
open economy balance of trade and current account position equal zero.at steady
state.
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A.4 Saving/Investment Imbalance
In the following section, I investigate the sign of a rest of the world
negative fertility shock on both the balance-of-trade and the current
account position, using the di¤erential expressions presented in appendix
A.3.
I need to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether or
not the transmission of the shock operates.
If  
 drRWt0dRWt , for all time periods the world economy remains at
equilibrium of type 1. A rest of the world negative fertility shock has
no impact either on the small open economy balance-of-trade and the
current account position.
If  <
 drRWt0dRWt0 , a rest of the world negative fertility shock a¤ects the
small open economy balance-of-trade and the current account position.
Assuming the world economy is initially at its steady state, before the
end of t0 1; the balance-of-trade and the current account are not a¤ected
by a rest of the world shock. At the time period the shock occurs, that
is between t0   1 and t0, the small open economy experiences capital
inows. Saving from the rest of the world is owing into the small open
economy in order to nance capital which will be used in the production
at time t. Using (45) and (49), the small open economy deviation from
steady state of the trade balance and the current account position at the
end of time t0   1 is given by the following expression:
dbSOEt0 1
d
=
dgSOEt0 1
d
=  dk
SOE
t0
dRW
< 0 (50)
Indeed, in presence of diminishing returns, capital ows from the
rest of the world to the small open economy to exploit the di¤erence in
returns resulting from the rest of the world fertility shock.
At the end of time t0, the capital ows out of the small open economy
as capital is repatriated to the rest of the world in order to nance old-
aged investor consumption that formally rewrites dg
SOE
t
d
> 0 for t = t0.
Indeed, I have formally that:
dgSOEt0
d
=

1 +
 kSOEss f 00(kSOEss )
2 + 

dkSOEt0
dRW
  dk
SOE
t0+1
dRW
(51)
Note that from (15) and (14) I have dg
SOE
t
d
> 0 if :
1 +
 kSOEss f 00(kSOEss )
2 + 

drRWt0
dRW
  dr
RW
t0+1
dRW
< 0 (52)
so that it reduces to:
23

1 +
 kSOEss f 00(kSOEss )
2 + 

>
dkRWt0+1
dkRWt0
(53)
From (12), I have that
dgSOEt0
d
> 0: At period t0 capital ows out of the
small open economy in order to nance the rest of the world individuals
old-aged consumption. It is also straightforward to show that at time
t0, a rest of the world shock has a positive impact on the small open
economy balance-of-trade.
For t  t0 + 1, given the transitory nature of the shock it can be
shown that there are no capital ows from the rest of the world to the
small open economy.
Substituting (15) into (49) gives dg
SOE
t
d
= 0. Indeed, the details of
substitution are as follows:

kSOEss f
00
(kSOEss )
2 + 

drRWt 1
dRW
  dr
RW
t+1
dRW
=  

1 +
 kSOEss f 00(kSOEss )
2 + 

drRWt
dRW
(54)
Using (14) I obtain the following expression:

kSOEss f
00
(kSOEss )
2 + 

dk
RW
t 1
dRW
  dk
RW
t+1
dRW
=  

1 +
 kSOEss f 00(kSOEss )
2 + 

dk
RW
t
dRW
(55)
Dividing (55) by dk
RW
t
dRW
, I obtain the following expression:

kSOEss f
00
(kSOEss )
2 + 

dk
RW
t 1
dkRWt
  dk
RW
t+1
dk
RW
t
=  

1 +
 kSOEss f 00(kSOEss )
2 + 

(56)
Recall that from (12), I have for t > t0:
dk
RW
t+1
dk
RW
t
=
 kSOEss f 00(kSOEss )
2 + 
(57)
so that I obtain the following valid identity:
 1   k
SOE
ss f
00
(kSOEss )
2 + 
=

 1   k
SOE
ss f
00
(kSOEss )
2 + 

(58)
Similarly, it is also straightforward to show that for t  t0, there
is no e¤ect of a rest of the world shock on the small open economy
balance-of-trade.
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As perfect capital mobility is assumed, the adjustment occurs instan-
taneously at the end of period t0   1 (when capital ows into the small
open economy) and at the end of time t0 (when capital is repatriated in
order to nance old-aged consumption of individuals living in the rest of
the world).
A.5 Lifetime Utility Function Linearization
Let U it describe the lifetime utility of individuals born at time t living
in region i for i = fSOE;RWg. Formally, U it is given by the following
expression:
U it = u(c
i
1;t) +
u(ci2;t+1)
1 + 
(59)
with ci1;t and c
i
2;t+1 given by:
ci1;t=w
i
t

1 + 
2 + p

(60)
ci2;t+1=

wit
2 + p

(1 + rit+1) (61)
Di¤erentiating (59) with respect to nRWt around the economy steady
state gives the following expression:
dU it
dRW
= u0(ci1;ss)
dci1;t
dRW
+ u0(ci2;ss)
1
1 + 
dci2;t+1
dRW
(62)
with the corresponding consumption prole at steady state:
ci1;ss=w
i
ss

1 + 
2 + p

(63)
ci2;ss=

wiss
2 + p

(1 + riss) (64)
Factors prices deviation from steady state are given by the following
expressions:
dwit
dRW
= kissf 00(kiss)
dkit
dRW
(65)
drit
dRW
= f 00(kiss)
dkit
dRW
(66)
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Young and old-aged consumption deviations from steady state are
given by:
dci1;t
dRW
=
dwit
dRW

1 + 
2 + p

(67)
dci2;t+1
dRW
=
dwit
dRW
1
2 + p
(1 + riss) +

wiss
2 + p

drit+1
dRW
(68)
Given the logarithmic utility assumption, the deviation from the
steady state of the lifetime utility of an individual born at time t in
region i reduces to the following expression:
dU it
dRW
=
1
ci1;ss
dci1;t
dRW
+
1
ci2;ss
1
1 + 
dci2;t+1
dRW
(69)
A.6 Lifetime Utility
In the following, I prove that a negative fertility shock a¤ects posi-
tively the lifetime welfare of an individual living in country i (for i =
fSOE;RWg) provided that the economy i is below its golden rule of
capital accumulation.
Combining (67) and (68) with (69), I obtain the following expression:
dU it
dRW
=
dwit
dRW

1
ci1;ss

1 + 
2 + p

+
(1 + riss)
ci2;ss
1
1 + 
1
2 + p

+
drit+1
dRW

1
ci2;ss
1
1 + 

wiss
2 + p

(70)
The impact of lifetime utility of an individual born after t0   1 is
positive if the following condition holds:
dwit
dRW
(1 + riss)

(2 + )
wiss

>   dr
i
t+1
dRW
(71)
using the above expression combined with (12), (65) and (66), I ob-
tain the following condition:
(1 + riss)
(1 + niss)
>
dkit+1
dkit
(72)
Given the local stability condition, a su¢ cient condition for a nega-
tive fertility shock to a¤ect positively the lifetime welfare of an individual
living in country i is given by
riss > n
i
ss (73)
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If the economy is above the golden rule that formally rewrites, riss <
niss, two cases need to be distinguished. First, if the following inequalities
hold, then a negative fertility shock a¤ects positively the lifetime welfare
of an individual living in country i born after period t0.
dkit+1
dkit
<
(1 + riss)
(1 + niss)
< 1 (74)
Second, if the following inequalities hold, then a negative fertility
shock a¤ects negatively the lifetime welfare of an individual living in
country i born after period t0.
(1 + riss)
(1 + niss)
<
dkit+1
dkit
< 1 (75)
Thus the economy being above the golden rule is a necessary but not
su¢ cient condition for a negative fertility shock a¤ect negatively the
lifetime welfare of an individual living in country i born after period t0.
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